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I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the factors influencing the 
~ of demographic knowledge in the formulation, implementation and evaluation 
of public policies. The focus of the discussion is to conceptualize the 
dynamic and interactive nature of the supply and demand for demographic 
knowledge, or more generally, analyze the structure of the market for such 
knowledge. 
Since the decade of the fifties, there have been significant shifts in 
both the supply of and the demand for demographic knowledge. Furthermore, the 
"structure of the market" for the policy utilization of such knowledge in the 
developing countries seems to have been facing significant changes that may 
impair the efficiency of its clearance function. This is due to the preva-
lence of a high degree of socio-political instabilities, the technicalization 
of demographic knowledge, the introduction of significant technological 
innovation (e.g., computers) and the presence of national and international 
institutional uncertainties (e.g., the changing roles and commitments of 
foreign aid donors). Accordingly, explanation of patterns.of demographic 
knowledge utilization should be viewed in the larger context of social 
management and needs to probe into the organization and the socio-political 
structure of society. 
Thanks toR. Urzua, R. Andorka, T. Frejka, H. W. Mosley, J. F. Kantner and 
K. Hill for valuable discussion. The author acknowledges the valuable 
research assistance of Salam Samaan, Hassan Zaky and Xiyan Zhao. In its core, 
the present paper benefitted from the background studies presented and the 
discussion that followed at the IUSSP-CUDKP seminars that took place in Cairo, 
Egypt (November 1984), Bombay, India (January 1985) and Lima, Peru (January 
1986); and in particular, on the conceptual framework developed by R. Urzua 
(1986). 
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a. demographic factors are important components of the structure and 
dynamics of society; 
b. significant social policy problems are an outcome of imbalances 
between the demographic and non-demographic components of society; 
c. such imbalances can be purposefully modified by policy; and 
d. it is assumed that policy makers are rational (in the scientific 
sense) in their decision process, although initial choice of the 
policy direction may have been based on "faith." 
Accordingly, the reason for the inadequate use of knowledge, assuming it to be 
available and of usable quality, could be the result of either a lack of the 
assumed agreement on at least one of the first three areas (a-c), or a lack of 
the assumed rationality in the process of policy formulation and implementa-
tion. 
Urzua's conceptualization provides a good starting point for the opera-
tional classification and specification of the various factors influencing the 
utilization of demographic knowledge. For example, it is possible to organize 
the discussion in terms of forces responsible for the production/supply side 
of demographic knowledge, and those responsible for its demand/utilization. 
The responsiveness of the supply and demand will depend, among other things, 
on the "structure" and "efficiency" of the market in which they operate. The 
type, structure and boundaries of that market may be defined with reference to 
the socio-political environment and status of society, e.g., the stage of the 
demographic transition, the level of socio-economic development, the level of 
administrative/managerial skills, the socio-political milieu, the role of the 
international system, and the type and cost of the demographic information 
exchanged. It is evident that some issues or factors may not be easily 
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tional migration, an important recent phenomenon (emerging during the decades 
of the seventies and eighties) for many Asian countries. But the level of 
coverage, quality, disaggregation, or continuity of this type of descriptive 
knowledge is sub-optimal in many developing countries' settings, and as 
discussed below, its predictive power is limited by its interactive nature 
with the rest of the socio-economic factors--a process that is not firmly 
established. 
Second, demographic changes will have consequences for the socio-
economic system. Under non-stationary conditions both the total and sectoral 
production of output and its utilization will be affected. It is useful, 
however, to recognize that the behavioral responses of the economic demogra-
phic system must make themselves felt through a more general system identity, 
relating the structure of population change to total and per capita output 
growth, to illustrate: 
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knowledge. However, as discussed below, conceptual knowledge on consequences 
is in the developmental phase. 
Third, having identified disequilibria in the socio-economic-demographic 
system, a development strategy is usually formulated. This is optimally done 
through the specification of a social welfare criterion W(P), and where social 
policies, including population policies could optimally be set within this 
generalized framework of the desired state of social welfare. Here, the full 
.range of demographic knowledge (descriptive, determinants and consequences) is 
required. It enters in the formulation of specific population and other 
socio-economic policies and programs, 
Fourth, the extent of the instrumental use of demographic knowledge will 
depend on whether policy makers, given their socio-political milieu, were 
convinced that demographic forces can be and should be modified by policy and, 
accordingly, contribute to the reduction of the perceived undesirable imbalan-
ces between the demographic and the non-demographic components of society. 
Clearly, this is partly controlled by the prevailing ideology, but partly 
facilitated by a minimum knowledge of the determinants of demographic behavior 
(i.e,, fertility, mortality and migration), especially the ability to identify 
among them those factors that could be manipulated by policy. 
Finally, policy interventions and target setting imply the need for 
evaluating the outcomes of the various socio-economic and population policies. 
Here also demographic knowledge is essential to measuring the significance of 
changes in the population and its structure as a denominator in the various 
indicators and to measuring the fertility, mortality and population distri-
bution impact of these policies. Controlling for the effect of random and 




3. THE THORNY ISSUE OF DEFINING UTILIZATION 
The presence or absence of demographic data or analyses in socio-
economic national planning documents may not imply either the use or the non-
use of such knowledge. For example, in his extensive review of sixty 
development plans, Maxwell Stamper (1977, p.9) indicates that a country's 
omission of one of the demographic parameters may indicate that planners did 
not have the data; had the data but felt they were not sufficiently important 
or of the appropriate quality; had the data available but not furnished 
appropriately on time; or that planners lack demographic skills or are 
unwilling to make or accept demographic assumptions about the future. Here we 
are differentiating in the spirit of the new home economics between the 
purchase of a good and its utilization. Buying meat (a good) provides utility 
only indirectly as an input into the production of a meal (a basic commodity) 
that provides direct utility to its consumers. Thus we should not confuse 
inputs with outputs. But it is possible, as Hofsten (1977, pp.l02-104) 
indicated, that the intention behind the development plan may not be sincere, 
and, accordingly, the "outputs" are ambiguous. 
Plan failure may be due to being over-ambitious relative to available 
resources, or to the absence of real commitment and effort on the part of the 
government to its realization. In such a case, there should be no real need 
or effective demand for the utilization of various types of demographic 
knowledge. However, the demand for demographic knowledge seems to exist and 
to have increased during the past two decades under varied settings (Stamper, 
1977), including those "where there are only negligible or unrealistic 
planning activities and where the actual course of development deviated con-
siderably from the original plans" (Hofsten, 1977, p.l03). Hofsten (1977) 
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population policies was the failure of the population program to reduce 
poverty! An objective that cannot be achieved through the efforts of the 
population program independently of the country's total commitment to develop-
ment. Thus, according to the Commission: 
" ... after one-and-a-half billion pesos were spent in curbing 
population .•. (the population program) failed to achieve results. 
. .All these efforts and all the money spent have gone to waste as 
the population programs have not in any way yielded positive 
results in alleviating mass poverty ... poverty increased from 40% 
to 80% during the Marcos years ... (the program) succeeded only in 
alienating people." (Mita Pardo DeTavero, 1986) 
Here, the population program, which is only one of many socio-economic policy 
"inputs" responsible for the "production" of a desired "social output," i.e., 
the reduction of poverty, is being blamed for the policy makers' (producers) 
inabi'lity to achieve the target--a failure that may be a result of inadequate 
specification and implementation of the policy or the lack of political 
commitment in the first place. 
In such circumstances it will be difficult to develop an objective yard-
stick that measures the extent of demographic knowledge utilization indepen-
dently of the underlying "objective(s)" of the demand for such knowledge and 
of the "outcome" of its use. And in many instances, the way socio-economic 
policy questions are phrased predetermines or limits the scope of their 
answers (cf. the structure of the nine policy questions in the NAS, 1986 
Report, and for a discussion see Demeny, 1986). More specifically, the policy 
• 
use of demographic knowledge, or for that matter the scope of such knowledge, 
can be best "assessed" with reference to the specific social criteria under-
lying such policies. For the previous conceptualization to be operational, 
active interaction and mutual responsiveness must exist between the suppliers 
and demanders of demographic knowledge. 
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tunity costs, or of the practical feasibility and viability of alternative 
population policy options, including that of non-intervention. 
Demographers seem to move from the "positive" elucidation of "what is," 
into the "normative" prescription of "what ought to be." This is a healthy 
sign. It moves demography from its pre-Darwinian stage, in the sense that the 
latter defined science as nothing more than the collection of facts about 
nature. A healthy sign as long as the social scientist indicates the value 
premises underlying the analyses and conclusions. 
Integrating technical demography in a social science framework has the 
benefit of increasing the likelihood that the specification of demographic 
variables and the development of new methods and concepts become more relevant 
to the needs of policy analyses. Examples of such fruitful development (see 
Lee, 1982, and Keyfitz, 1979 and references cited therein for more details) 
include the decomposition of fertility [due to Henry (1961), Davis and Blake 
(1956), Freedman (1965) and Bongaarts (1978)], or the development of indirect 
estimation techniques [due to Brass (1964)]. But the integrity and perceived 
objectivity of the produced demographic knowledge could be adversely affected 
if its content or coverage were manipulated to serve the political objectives 
of some dominant actors in the science-politic relation. Such experience is 
not uncommon in many countries, including Asian countries. Examples include 
the selective reporting of demographic knowledge, e. g., the manipulation of~-- ____ _ 
census coverage or changing its content for public reporting, or the crediting 
to the population planning program more than its share in the reported decline 
in fertility. Such incidents are not uncommon in the policy field, e.g., 
witness the production of employment statistics to suit political objectives. 
But in the case of demography, a recent intruder into the science-policy 
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demographic knowledge and the extent of its policy use--a commitment that 
needs strengthening in most settings in the developing countries. For 
example, population projection plays an important role in the preparation of 
five year plans. It provides upper and lower boundaries beyond which 
demographic trends are unlikely to occur. The implication is that the most 
likely event is somewhere in-between--usually a medium projection. But as 
Keyfitz (1981, p.590) indicated, policy makers: 
" ... cannot derive any help from the notion that each of the projections 
corresponds to a different set of assumptions and that it is up to the 
user to consider the three sets of assumptions, decide which is the most 
realistic, and choose that one. If he actually goes to the trouble and 
has the skill to reflect on the alternative sets of assumptions and 
decide which is most realistic, then he might as well make the 
calculation in addition--that is a relatively easy matter once all the 
assumptions are specified. If on the other hand, as more commonly 
happens, the user looks at the results and takes whichever of the three 
projections seems to him most likely, then the demographer has done 
nothing for him at all--the user who is required to choose on the basis 
of which of the results looks best might as well choose among a set of 
random numbers." 
The experience of India during the past three decades or so seems to be 
somewhere between these "two Keyfitz extremes." Population estimates prepared 
-by the census group and presented as the "most likely" forecast of future 
trends, turn out to be consistently an underestimate of the actual population 
realized by a factor of 6-8 percent. Accordingly, planners, to be on the safe 
side, get conditioned to inflate census forecasts by a "safety" factor of 
about 30 to 50 million people! (Gassen, 1978). 
It is the knowledge about demographic determinants, and the development 
and implementation of policy measures based on those determinants to influence 
the course of demographic events, that provide the social science content for 
demographic analysis. Indeed, there is nothing so practical as good theory, 
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and organizational commitment will produce diminishing increments of effective 
utilization. In the case of formulation or implementation of population 
policies it is questionable, for example, that additional knowledge derived 
from more investment in the implementation and analysis of fertility surveys, 
especially if externally designed and supported, would have a significant 
effect on its effective utilization if there was no commitment for such 
policies in the first place. The previous discussion assumes the presence of 
a "rational" market for demographic knowledge where the value system of those 
responsible for the production and utilization of such knowledge (including 
demographers) is independent of its scientific content--an assumption that 
needs some scrutiny. 
4. THE POPULATION POLICY DEBATE: VA11JES IN THEORIES 
The debate about the role of population policies in development planning 
plays an important part in the production (supply) of demographic knowledge, 
the demand for its use, and ultimately its actual utilization, especially its 
policy use. The literature is enormous on the origin and dimensions of that 
debate. On the eve of the U.N. Bucharest Population Conference, Berelson 
(1975) in a Plato-type symposium, polarized the debate as a dialogue among 
three actors: proponents of family planning; advocates of social and develop-
ment planning; and academics. Berelson's "symposium" succeeded in presenting 
the main issues of the debate with exceptional clarity, and in illustrating 
the diversity of views, but lacked the presence of "a Plato," i.e., the role 
of a moderator or a synthesizer. More than a decade later, and with an 
increased wealth of publications, including a large number of conferences, the 
issues are far from being resolved (cf. P. Demeny [1986]; and the Review 
Symposiums presented in the Ell& on The Ultimate Resource [1982], on the World 
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[1988] for an attempt to deal with statistical and conceptual estimation 
~ssues). 
Accordingly, the current state of demographic knowledge seems to produce 
(a) more than one explanation for an observed change in demographic events; 
(b) far less consensus in predicting future demographic events; and (c) dis-
agreements regarding the "need" and the "how" for public intervention. 
Attention shifted from elucidating the demographic transition as an integrated 
system to a more specialized focus, mainly isolated, on selected components. 
Accordingly, demography developed its own sub-disciplines, e.g., child sur-
vival, urbanization, reproductive health, international migration, teenage 
fertility, with the familiar danger of developing different languages, 
.defining boundaries, and imperfect communication. 
2. On mortality: A large portion of the spectacular mortality decline 
·~n the developing countries that took place during the three decades between 
1940 and 1970 seems to have occurred independently of the level of socio-
economic development. The mean life expectancy of the LOGs rose from 38.8 
. years in 1940 to 59,5 years in 1970, a rate of increase of 1.4 percent per 
annum. It is estimated that about one-third of the observed change in life 
expectancy during that period can be attributed to the growth of per capita 
income, and about two-thirds to a structural change and the importation of 
public health measures (Preston, 1980 and Fuchs, 1980). By the mid-1980's, 
the pace of the decline in mortality slowed down and significant inter- and 
intra-country differentials in the levels of mortality emerged (cf. Gwatkin, 
1980; Bulatao and Elwan, 1985), In 1984, the average life expectancy at birth 
for the 36 low income countries was 60 years (World Bank, 1986, p.lSO). China 
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exogenous (for a discussion cf. Sirageldin, 1986), created the potential for 
serious disequilibria between the demographic and the non-demographic elements 
of the social system. These include, for example, the presence of "demograph-
ically-induced" gaps between the supply and demand for labor or for various 
social services, e.g., education and health. The effect of these disequi-
librating forces on the stability of the system, being families, communities 
or a nation, i.e., its ability to adjust, will vary depending on the level and 
quality of the society's resource endowment, the flexibility-rigidity of its 
social and political micro and macro institutions, and its commitment to 
policies that enhance socio-economic development planning. 
As a result, anti-natalist policies emerged as a natural prescription. 
It became the main focal point of population policies advocated in many of the 
developing countries, including the two most populous: China and India. In 
-1983, for example, 88 percent of the 2.3 billion people living in countries of 
the ESCAP region (South Asia and the Pacific) had government policies aiming 
to reduce the prevailing rates of population growth (United Nations, 1985, 
Vol.II, p.l62; see also Table A-1). In the decades of the sixties and 
seventies, demographic research seems to have been closely associated with the 
diffusion of contraception: from the operational organization of family 
planning programs to evaluating their fertility impacts. In this process of 
accelerated social dynamics, new social fertility related issues emerged in 
the population policy agenda of the developing countries such as teenage 
pregnancies. 
Demography backed with social science research seems to have ignited a 
practical policy agenda but in the process lost some degree of independence 
and vitality (cf. Demeny, 1988), Understandable uncertainties regarding, on 
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Sudan, designed policies that encourage and treat emigration as a supplement 
to the country's international trade activity (cf. Sirageldin, 1984). More 
recently, and expectedly, the issue of return migration emerges as a main 
policy concern (cf. Sirageldin, 1986). 
5. On the experience of the more developed countries: On the other end 
of the demographic transition, many industrial countries are increasingly 
facing serious disequilibrating forces in their socio-demographic structures, 
albeit in opposite directions. Forces that influence their perceived priori-
ties in the population-development policy domain, and more seriously, effec-
tively influencing the policy agenda of the developing countries in a non-
optimal way. The anticipated "golden state," at least in the demographic 
sphere, where mortality and fertility levels stabilize at lower levels, seems 
to have a more complex dynamic nature than foreseen, especially in its 
'interaction with the socio-economic system. The "transition" persists I Sig-
nificant socio-demographic changes, e.g., changes in the role of the family, 
especially the structure of its intra- and inter-generational social con-
tracts, in the roles and status of women and in the associated increases in 
the private opportunity cost of childbearing, are asserting themselves as an 
endogenous self-generating behavior mainly induced by the type of techno-
logical change and its rate of acceleration. The road to lower levels of 
vital rates is neither smooth nor has a clear direction. In the Unit~4 
States, for example, according to Easterlin et al. (1978, pp.l8-20), public 
intervention is called for in the economic-demographic system, since in " ... a 
self-generating mechanism in which, under conditions of high aggregate demand, 
(where) baby boom leads to baby bust and baby bust to baby boom ... the economic 
fortunes of different generations ... are shaped by circumstances beyond their 
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seem to emerge. Balancing costs and benefits in reproductive behavior seems 
to be redistributed on the national and international market place, posing 
some difficult ethical, distributional and legal questions. Surrogate 
mothers, mainly low income, emerge as trading the bearing of children for cash 
paid by prospective "half-foster" parents, mostly from higher income groups 
(e.g., the Stern-surrogate mother legal case in the USA recently in the 
courts). The average price (1987) of bearing a "surrogate" child in the USA 
is $20,000 divided equally between the surrogate mother and a lawyer. The 
implication of treating children as commodities produced in the market place 
to parental expected long-term (life) acceptance of and commitment to "the 
produced child" is yet to be sorted out, socially, ethically and intergenera-
tionally. 
On the international level the more traditional pattern of the distri-
bution of reproductive behavior continues. Immigration policies are being 
considered, with mixed blessings, as a kind of short-term safety net, if not a 
long-run solution in various industrial countries (cf. Bouvier, 1981, and for 
the U.S. case, Bouvier and Gardner, 1986). 
On the mortality and morbidity side, the transformation of the structure 
of dependency towards the elderly and the delayed onset of productive and 
reproductive activities created a complex set of social and health issues, 
e.g., how to care for the elderly; who bears the increasing cost, intensive in 
terms of human capital requirement and extensive in terms of dependency 
duration, of reproducing the new generations; how to cope with the social, 
economic and health dimensions of teenage pregnancies; or how to deal with 
sexually transmitted diseases, e.g., AIDS in low fertility situations, where 
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Fertility and other related socio-demographic and health surveys, they also 
provide financial and technical assistance for developing population units in 
Ministries of Planning and provide population training for nationals in and 
outside their home countries (cf. UNFPA, 1986; Herz, 1984; and the Monitoring 
Reports of UNFPA, OECD, or World Bank). 
Demographic knowledge--its supply structure and demand priorities--
created as a result of such intensified international effort, becomes close to 
an "international public good"--available universally at no or minimal cost 
for all individuals (countries) to consume. Its net benefit to policy 
analyses should be obvious. But in an international system of unequal power 
of exchange and persuasion, there is no guarantee that such outcome will 
.necessarily be "socially optimal," especially in its structure and distri-
bution. The international system seems to lack the free/equitable voting 
system necessary to provide the power for its consumer constituency to have a 
responsible say in the production, ·distribution or monitoring the "healthy 
utilization" of such "public" demographic knowledge. However, there are 
population-related issues that are clearly international in nature. Some may 
be considered as international public goods. Primary examples include the 
interrelations between population and the environment; and the consequences of 
international migration. The role of the international system in bringing 
these issues to focus and supporting the production and utilization of the 
necessary demographic knowledge for adequate policy analysis needs 
strengthening. 
The six aspects of recent population trends (past three decades), dis-
cussed briefly above, are more or less accepted by policy makers as 
established "demographic facts." However, it is evident that they do not 
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process of socio-demographic development: high levels of vital rates are 
associated with lower levels of modernity, industrialization, or development, 
and vice versa. Societies have been observed to modernize and simultaneously, 
as part of the process up the modernity ladder, undergo a transformation of 
their vital rates. 
In an early critical re-examination of the concept of the demographic 
'transition, Ansley Coale proposed three broad conditions as necessary for a 
society to attain a sustained decline in fertility (Coale, 1973, p.69; see 
also Teitelbaum, 1975, for a lucid evaluation): 
" ... the acceptance of calculated choice as a valid element in 
marital fertility, the perception of advantages from reduced fer-
tility, and knowledge and mastery of effective techniques of con-
trol ... Apparently modernization ultimately establishes these condi-
tions.11 
Although modernization generally underlies such a re-evaluation of the situ-
ation, Coale was careful to add that his three conditions may occur in com-
munities with "little" modernity: 
" ... there is no convincing basis for asserting that a program of 
indoctrination in the advantage of health and welfare from reduced 
fertility would inevitably be a failure in a rural poorly educated 
population. Acceptance of contraception by national and community 
leaders would help make rational choice in fertility acceptable." 
(emphasis added) 
It follows from Coale's "guarded" conjecture that a society can bridge the 
demographic transition and enter the era of low mortality and fertility rates, 
without experiencing significant change in its socio-economic conditrons, ~~~-~-·-
i.e., maintaining its traditional environment, where 
" ... the economic organization ... turns almost wholly about the 
family, and the perpetuation of the family is the main guarantee of 
support and elemental security," and where life has not as yet 
"stripped the family of many functions in production, consumption, 
recreation, and education." (Notestein, 1953, quoted in Coale, 
1973) 
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human productivity and well-being, and, accordingly, the generation of·a 
sustained and effective private and public demand for better health. 
The recent record, however, seems to portray a more complex and a some-
what pessimistic picture. Indeed, there has been a significant increase in 
mortality reduction that is paralleled by a sizeable increase in health 
expenditure on the national and international levels. That increase was 
,partly generated through improved living standards, but mostly through the 
impetus of the resultant accelerated rates of population growth. This 
increase in aggregate health expenditure, and not necessarily in per capita 
expenditure, coincided with the emergence of socially unacceptable intra-
country patterns of the distribution of health status and benefits, and an 
acceleration in the real cost of health delivery in developing countries. A 
pattern that seriously threatens the initial gains. 
International agencies, committed to the supporting and financing of 
health care systems in developing countries, became increasingly concerned 
about these issues. However, it seems that the remedial solutions being 
considered continue to follow the "standstill" scenario. It seems to con-
centrate on introducing innovations in medical technologies (cf. UNICEF, 
1985), or in management techniques and strategies, to improve the efficiency 
of the health delivery system (cf. World Bank, 1987) and not as much on the 
micro and macro socio-economic factors whose change is necessary to endogenize 
the demand and supply for health output. In some instances, issues of equity 
and the role of the public sector are being set aside. Proposed reforms call 
for the privatization of the health system, sometimes under the guise of more 
efficiency, e.g., user charges or cost-recovery in general, but without 
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In its present state, demographic knowledge does not provide a critical 
assessment of the implied inter- and intra-generational socio-economic net 
benefits to societies travelling the road of the "standstill" scenario. That 
knowledge, uncertain as it is, is being used by policy makers nevertheless, 
sometimes for making some political points, but sometimes with serious conse-
quences to the direction and commitment to existing policies. For example, 
the apparent recent change in the Filipino Government commitment to its 
"previous" population policy and program, mentioned earlier, was based partly 
on judging the program on its ability to reduce the level of national poverty-
-an objective neither included in its mandate nor within the reach of its 
operational structure; and partly on the questionable proposition (see 
,discussion below) that: 
"The (then existing) policy is based on a disproven and discredited 
economic theory: that population pressure hinders economic growth. 
There is a wealth of statistical evidence that proves that popula-
tion growth has been a major stimulus for economic development and 
progress in countries that are now industrialized ... The new~ 
doctrine on population states that the most effective solut~on to 
the population problem is economic development and social justice." 
(emphasis added, from the Report of the Filipino 1986 Constitu-
tional Committee, quoted in the address by De Tavera (November 
1986) 
Policies could be inadequately evaluated if their objectives were ambiguously 
stated or grossly over-estimated and, accordingly, "were not fulfillable in 
the first place." Our contention is that the Philippine policy change, just 
described, is a logical outcome of a "standstill scenario." It is not easy to 
put empirical content to such scenario. However, an examination of the recent 
historical experience of socio-demographic change provides some indications of 
the potential consequences experienced by societies travelling that path. 
In the stylized framework of the demographic transition, abstracting 
from the time dimension and assuming no symmetrical reversal, population 
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Tomes, 1976); changes in the psycho-social value of children (cf. J. Fawcett, 
1970 and 1972); or in changes in the net value of "inter-generational wealth 
flow" (cf. Caldwell, 1982). These changes are associated with minimum levels 
of industrialization, of labor-saving technologies, of acceptance of western 
modes of modern behavior, and of female education and its market opportuni-
ties, where the opportunity cost of time in reproductive activities is rising. 
The absence of such socio-economic "changes" weakens the private and social 
support to reduce fertility. It is not evident, however, what the conditions 
are that bring about a sustained state of industrialization, i.e., whether it 
could be a consequence of a standstill scenario. It is evident, however, that 
these economic-demographic processes to be operative require the presence of 
•significant structural changes in the social system (cf. Jones, 1985; Siragel-
din, 1979). Furthermore, higher dependency, especially at the higher end of 
the age distribution, combined with low levels of per capita income implies a 
relatively high level of "demographic investment" (cf. United Nations, 1973, 
for definition), that could translate into a serious degree of socio-demogra-
phic pressure. 
To illustrate, the dependency burden of the elderly increases as fer-
tility declines while the familial support for such dependency tends to weaken 
as family size declines, reducing the efficacy of the traditional network for 
inter-generational transfers. It would be an error to evaluate the __ c_h_ange _i_n ______________ _ 
the family support system only in terms of changes in numbers, e.g., family or 
kin size. Equally important are changes in actual or perceived commitments, 
e.g., the earlier erosion of the social contract. In such circumstances, 
social policies need to supplement private institutions. Such policies are 
not costless. They imply sizable, and in the presence of limited resource 
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group and at the same time prepared itself for industrial take-off, e.g., as 
fertility declined by 43 percent, China's industrial output as a percent of 
GDP has increased to 44 percent--a level that is equal to that of many NICs 
(see Tables A-1 and A-2). But the development of such industrial potential 
may not necessarily materialize in other developing societies. For example, 
Sri Lanka--a country that experienced a rapid decline in fertility since the 
early 1950's--continued to be predominantly rural with a stagnant economy. 
One may debate whether the large decline in fertility in places such as 
Sri Lanka or Kerala has been a consequence of some structural changes that 
influenced the perceived private net benefit of children, including reducing 
the costs of fertility regulation (cf. Freedman, 1979; Knodel, 1977; Hull, 
<1978), but we are left with the uncomfortable conclusion that "we are clearly 
''in a position where we have much less difficulty in 'explaining' fertility 
declines that already occurred than in predicting where and when future 
declines will occur'! (Jones, 1985). Or the more pessimistic one that" 
this change in reproductive behavior is undoubtedly the most dramatic in human 
history and merits the designation 'fertility revolution.' Yet its causes 
remain unknown (Easterlin and Crimmins, 1985). 
The question leaves out, however, the equally perplexing policy issue 
raised in the present discussion of the "standstill" scenario, namely: what 
are the socio-economic consequences of such decline on "stagnant" rural 
economies? Could such societies extract enough surplus, (a) to produce a 
higher level of human capital with higher productivity, i.e., with enough 
capital goods, to support the changing structure of dependency, and (b) to 
continue to provide the family support essential for the welfare of the 
elderly? Or put more generally, as our earlier discussion of the econo-
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do not necessarily indicate causation. This is true. Insufficient knowledge 
about the underlying mechanism should not provide a strong case for a causal 
interpretation, e.g., define modernity as the presence of a demographic regime 
with low levels of vital rates. Clearly a •standstill" scenario could have 
significant policy implications! What is required is careful analyses and 
continuous evaluation of policy consequences. 
2. An invisible hand scenario: A fundamental question underlying the 
previous discussion is whether the existing socio-demographic trends and 
policies of the low income-high fertility countries (e.g., countries below the 
3 percent GNP per capita growth illustrated in Figure 2) " ... suffice to put 
(them) on a socially optimal demographic path ... all the way to replacement 
·level?" And, if not, is there a role for demographic knowledge to bring about 
better public policies to influence population change? (Demeny, 1986, p.486). 
A partial answer to the first question posed by Demeny will probably not be in 
the affirmative. Countries such as Bangladesh, Burma, Nepal and Pakistan, or 
for that matter most of the states of India, have either a weak or nonexistent 
population program, and have not had much success in their income growth 
either (see.Figure 2). But for some students of socio-demographic change, 
both questions do not even need to arise. Rapid population growth should not 
cause policy concerns. On the one hand, economic-demographic imbalances 
coupled with the young-age characteristic of a growing population provide a 
driving force for productive and innovative adaptation, and some even argue 
that the total sum of human ingenuity, responsible for "relaxing" the physical 
and social constraints that hinder human growth and advancement, is a positive 
function of population size. Societies seem to have acquired an eternal self-
regulating mechanism that handles minor disturbances as well as major bodily 
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cost of such induced unemployment could be tolerated in the context of'That-
cher's England or Reagan's USA, where most of the workers affected are covered 
by unemployment insurance, and the potential unrest of the victims of such 
•voodoo economics" can be suppressed. More importantly, the causes of un-
employment in these advanced industrial economies are not necessarily struc-
tural in nature, i.e., unemployment insurance acts both as a social security 
measure and as an automatic stabilizer. 
But these causes of unemployment, in advanced industrial economies, 
cannot be compared or should not be confused with those existing in developing 
rural economies experiencing fundamental economic-demographic imbalances, and 
where unemployment insurance neither exists nor could be fiscally supported. 
Indeed Adam Smith made explicit conditions for the realization of these 
.optimal social and individual benefits in his celebrated invisible-hand 
scenario. These assumed conditions, as Demeny (1986) adequately demonstrated, 
do not necessarily prevail (see also A. Sen, 1987), especially in developing 
societies where socio-demographic imbalances are significantly apparent. 
It is instructive to note that that self-propelling signalling mechanism 
may also fail in the context of the more developed countries. For example, 
where the individualistic household neo-classical model of fertility is 
applied to the present experience of the developed countries, it provides no 
guarantee for a self-regulating econo-demographic mechanism, i.e., in the 
absence of public policy intervention. As P. Schultz (1981, p.234) concludes 
in his analysis based on the neoclassical demand theory of fertility: 
"If technical change and the accumulation of physical capital 
continue to increase labor productivity and wages, and encourage 
further per capita investments in human capital, the price of time 
should continue to increase in the future and contribute further to 
the reduction in fertility. Consequently, the price-of-time 
hypothesis that drives the (neo-classical) demand theory of fer-
4L 
result in negative rates of population growth (a decline in absolute stze), 
but with higher content of human capital--the celebrated substitution of 
quality for quantity, e.g., one hundred people with a high content of human 
capital are equal to two hundred with half that endowment. However, demogra-
phic accounting tells us that a significant decline in absolute numbers is not 
likely. For example, it is doubtful that the present European population size 
will return to its 1940 lower level even if the below-replacement fertility 
level of the 1985 base persisted (with the exception of East Germany it might 
take several decades to return to that earlier lower level, e.g., as long as 
45 years for Austria and 134 years for France [cf. Day, 1988]). But in the 
context of an invisible hand scenario with a world of rational expectations, a 
new socio-demographic solution (regardless of its outcome!) should be viewed 
as the "normal" outcome of "market behavior" and, as a matter of conceptual 
consistency, should not cause any reason for alarm or policy concern. 
But this is clearly not the case. There are inter- and intra-
generational losers and gainers in this socio-demographic dynamics. The 
optimality of demographic behavior on both ends of the demographic transition 
is not guaranteed and calls for policy concerns and interventions. But in 
doing so, the rationale for interfering with the "clearing function" of an 
alleged "perfect" socio-demographic market with "rational" expectations must 
be stated explicitly, objectively and consistently according to the rules of 
the invisible hand policy game! It is evident that self-regulation in the 
socio-economic-demographic system is neither automatic nor costless. The 
system, whether industrial or traditional, must be continuously monitored, 
evaluated, and adjusted. Demography serves both as an input (tool) and as an 
objective (target) in such policy analysis. 
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between individual countries and the collective universal welfare becomes more 
difficult to sort out and resolve. Furthermore, whether that game has a 
positive-sum solution when played on a worldwide scale is yet to be proven and 
its socio-political consequences analyzed. 
On balance, the on-going process of integrating technical demography in 
a social science framework has been a healthy process. It also implies that 
additional investment in the hard core of demographic knowledge, especially in 
making it more accessible to the needs of policy analysis, will continue to 
yield positive returns. For example, demographic analyses provide boundaries 
for potential changes in the age structure, in the structure of fertility, and 
in other demographic conditions, thus reducing the unnecessary heat of "alarm-
_ists" type policy discussions. 
45 
Table 1. Bangladesh: Basic Data 
Population (in millions) 
Area in sq Jan 
Density in sq Jan 
Density per sq Jan of arable land 
Birth rate per 1,000 
Death rate per 1,000 
Natural rate of growth of population per 1,000 



















Total fertility rate per woman 6.0 6.0 
Life expectation at birth - years 48 50 
Infant mortality rate per 1,000 140 132 
Maternal mortality rate per 1,000 30 
Percentage of population rural 94 83 
Percentage of population below 15 years 45 45 
GNP per capita US$ at 1970 market prices 72 140 
Unemployed (% of labor force) 30 32 
Labor force engaged in agriculture (%) 78 74 
Primary school enrollment (% of that school age group) 
Percent of population with adequate calorie 
56 62 
intake (1962-64) 
Percent of population with adequate per capita 
protein intake (1962-64) 
Population per physician . 





































little influence and percolate only slowly; it is hard for all to" see 
how life can be improved. 
"In the World Bank Atlas1 only Rwanda (only Ethiopia in 1985) was tenta-
tively estimated to have a smaller per capita income than Bangladesh; 
another two countries were bracketed with it, but none of these has 
anything like the population of Bangladesh. Only Indonesia has a pop-
ulation larger than that of Bangladesh and a per capita income not much 
greater; but Indonesia increased her per capita income by over 4 percent 
per annum in the period 1965 to 1972 while per capita income in 
Bangladesh declined. Since then Indonesia has gained significantly from 
its new oil wealth and from improved terms of trade while Bangladesh's 
relative position deteriorated markedly; war and its aftermath held back 
any increase in real income; population has continued to increase and 
real income to fall. 
"All this would not matter if Bangladesh were rich in natural resources 
and under-populated, if it were effectively governed and if its social 
order and economic system were geared to growth, but none of these 
things obtain. The terrain, in relation to the number of people that 
inhabit it, is inhospitable and often hostile. It is dominated by 
mighty rivers which in depositing silt both form and flood the territory 
over which they flow; in the monsoon the rainfall is intense and unpre-
dictable; the one certainty is that much of the land will be covered 
with water and loss of life and interruption to production from flooding 
may be considerable. Even more dangerous are the cyclones which unpre-
dictably can inundate vast areas of land and cause great damage and loss 
of life. The cyclone of 1970 killed 200,000 people and their animals 
and devastated much agricultural land. 
"Nothing short of a continuing massive injection of aid is likely in 
present circumstances to get the economy off the ground sufficiently 
quickly to give real impetus to the development effort. It is not easy 
to see how donor countries can be persuaded to maintain an effort on the 
scale needed. Bangladesh is not a country of strategic importance to 
any but her immediate neighbours. Politically, perhaps its only impor-
tance lies in its availability as a possible test bench of two opposing 
systems of development, collective and compulsive methods on the one 
hand, and a less fettered working of the private enterprise system on 
the other. It might be considered worthwhile by some countries to give 
aid to demonstrate the power of one or the other system, but it can 
scarcely be felt that large gains are likely to result from such an 
exercise, to Bangladesh or to potential contestants." 
(Numbers in parentheses refer to data for 1983-84, World [1985]). 
1 Published in 1974 
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distinction coincided with religious differentiation and jointly influenced 
Bengali society. A Bengali ethnic unit emerged irrespective of the regional 
and religious distinction approaching a nationalistic status as early as the 
sixteen to eighteenth century (Mukherjee, 1973, p.401). The view about the 
supremacy of Bengali nationhood even above religious affiliation is clearly 
stated by Abdul Majeed Khan (1960): 
The whole thesis about the Bengali Muslims centered round two alterna-
tives: either they were low caste Hindus converted to Islam, or they 
were immigrants, Mughal, Syeds, Pathans or at least Shaikhs. The third 
and possibly the more correct assessment, namely that they were essen-
tially neither but a distinct cultural entity could never occur to any 
one. Bengali soil and Bengali blood are admittedly of innumerable 
origins but they are distinct identities in themselves. History of the 
growth and development also made the Bengali culture a distinct culture 
and the people a distinct people ... So long as the traces of peculiar 
origin are preserved the immigrants will remain alien residents in 
Bengal rather than become people of Bengal. 
However, during the nineteenth century, socio-economic differentiation 
·took roots in religious growth. Thus, according to the 1871 census, quoted in 
Majeed Khan (1960): 
Hindus, with exceptions of course, are the principal zamindars, lukdars, 
[owners of large subinfeudatory estates], public officers, men of 
learning, moneylenders, traders, shopkeepers and [are] engaging in most 
active. pursuits of life and coming directly and frequently under the 
notice of the rulers of the country; while the Musalmans, with excep-
tions also, form a very large majority of the cultivators of the ground 
and of the day labourers, and others engaged in the very humblest forms 
of mechanical skill and of buying and selling. 
The "middle class" that developed in Bengal by the end of the nineteenth 
century was composed predominantly of Hindus. Yet the "Bengali" identity 
remained. According to Mukherjee (1973, p.404): 
In 1905, there was such a powerful movement against the British proposal 
to divide Bengal administratively into East and West that the proposal 
had to be hastily withdrawn. It may be that the intercommunity con-
flict, now in the open, failed to lead to a decisive rupture of Hindu-
Muslim relations because anti-British stances (displayed mostly by 
Hindus) during the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857, as well as the growing 
national movement from the 1890s on, had led the rulers to shift their 
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needs, e.g., food, clothes, shelter, education and health); guaranteeing 
employment; and checking the population explosion, among others. These issues 
reflect the main concerns of planners since the 1970s and will be examined 
briefly from the perspective of the implied demand for demographic knowledge. 
Population Concerns and Policies: The official document spelling out the 
First Five-Year Plan affirms population control as one of its priority 
concerns. It declared that "no civilized measure would be too drastic to keep 
the population of Bangladesh on the smaller side of 150 million for the sheer 
ecological viability of the nation (cf. Demeny, 1975; and UNFPA, 1978 for a 
discussion of the FFYP and the SFYP). Efforts have not been a success story, 
however. The population problem of Bangladesh is nowhere near solution . 
. During the circumstances of the seventies the most likely check to population 
growth was perceived as " ... famine possibly followed by some reaction along 
the lines of the irish Model." There is little reason to think that a steady 
and sustained increase in incomes will act fast enough to stem the continued 
increase in people. This has not materialized during the past two decades. 
Nor is there any reason to suppose that current trends will change direction 
in the near future. It is doubtful that the approaches so far attempted in 
Bangladesh, or for that matter in the Indian sub-Continent, to provide a 
balance between population trends and resource development, are likely to 
succeed in their present form. 
There is no shortage of ideas in the parts of the successive Five-Year 
Plans devoted to family planning but little that gives confidence that such 
ideas can be put into effect. It is hard to judge whether the measures 
delineated on paper are really capable of being translated into action, 
especially in the remote (in the sense of difficult accessibility), albeit 
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urban areas, the rural to urban migration cannot act as a safety valve. For 
example, in spite of rapid urbanization, the availability of arable land per 
rural family would decline from 2.1 acres at present to 1.8 acres in 1993, 
even with the optimistic fertility scenario. The clear implication is that 
the increases in agricultural production which were achieved in the seventies 
and early eighties will only buy Bangladesh a little more time to bring its 
rate of population growth under control. The "population-technology-push" 
scenarios of Boserup or J. Simon mentioned earlier are clearly beyond the 
objective reality of Bangladesh. 
Urbanization and Circulation: Assuming an increase in the percentage of urban 
population from 6 percent in 1965 to 22 percent in 1993 (17 percent in 1983), 
the urban population would increase 15 times at a minimum from over 4 million 
.in 1965 to about 25 million by 1993, an increase of 20 million population or a 
minimum of over 3 million families. This has been the pattern in the recent 
past. For example, the rural-urban transfer accounted for 11.1 percent of the 
rural natural increase and for 55.4 percent of urban growth during the period 
1961-74 (Kosinski and Elahi, 1985, p.lO). With the present situation of 
overcrowding in the poor dwellings in urban areas, absorption of numbers of 
this magnitude by cities in the future (particularly Dhaka where 40 percent of 
the urban population resides) is unthinkable (UNFPA, 1978), It is estimated 
that the capital cost for housing and public services of minimal urban 
accommodation for 3 million additional families would be about $430 million 
assuming $1,300 to be the urbanization cost per family. This would amount to 
over 3.5 percent of the 1984 GDP. 
Unemployment: The First Five-Year Plan assumed a decline in unemployment from 
30 percent at present to 25 percent in 1978 with a labor force of 29.4 
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would recede further, However, actual performance was far below the expected, 
and it seems that, even with an optimistic performance, the situation would 
not improve much. For example, if Bangladesh succeeded in improving signifi-
cantly on the past and achieved a growth rate of GDP per capita of 4 percent 
per annum over the next 30 years, it would mean only a per capita income of 
about $600 at the end of the period, i.e., by the year 2015, assuming more 
than a moderate decline in the rate of population growth--an optimistic 
,scenario since the realized average annual growth rate of GNP per capita was 
about 0.6 percent during the recent past, 1965-84 (see Table A-1 and World 
Bank [1986]). 
For the vast majority of the rural population, living standards declined 
·in absolute terms during the decades of the sixties and seventies, It is not 
true, however, that the income of all groups fell. It is the combination of a 
very unfavorable average resource endowment and a high degree of inequality 
that is mostly responsible for the concentration of extreme poverty in 
Bangladesh. The rise and persistence of poverty cannot be explained by 
demographic factors alone. The process of increasing impoverishment has been 
examined extensively (cf. A, R. Khan, 1977), Policy concerns are with both 
levels and differentials in life quality and chances. 
Population and Development Planning: Although the Government of Bangladesh 
perceives the population problem within the broader context of socio-economic 
change, little is done to analyze and consider in depth the sectoral conse-
quences of demographic trends, e.g., on consumption and investment; employ-
ment, education, health, housing, social welfare, the increased participation 
of women in the development process, urban growth, agricultural productivity 
or government services. Also, it seems that not enough attention was given to 
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birth and death rates is a basic handicap and makes the difficult task 
of the national population programme even more difficult." 
One may hardly disagree with the conclusion that the system of demo-
graphic data needs strengthening, but may question that present knowledge 
about the dynamics of the demographic and socio-economic system in Bangladesh 
is not adequate for providing direction for policy formulation and implementa-
tion. 
The statistical data system of Bangladesh was reorganized according to a 
Government order in August 1974 to allow for greater centralization and 
quality control as well as raising its status to a division within the Central 
Government hierarchy. 
Specifically, the order provided for the amalgamation of the Bureau of 
Statistics, the Bureau of Agricultural Statistics, the Population Census 
Commission and the Agricultural Census Commission into one organization, the 
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS). Statistical cells, 14 in number, in 
various ministries and departments would continue to function in order to meet 
the internal data requirements of their respective agencies. This reorgan-
ization was followed up three years later, in August 1977, by the establish-
ment of the National Statistical Council for the purpose of developing a data 
base for development planning. The Council, which has 18 members from 
government agencies and non-governmental institutions, is chaired by the 
Member of the President's Council of Advisors in Charge of the Ministry of 
Planning. The Secretary, Statistical Division of the Planning Commission and 
Director-General, Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, is Vice-Chairman of the 
Council. The Council's functions include acting as the high-powered policy-
making body in the field of statistics at the national level; coordinating the 
statistical programs of all the ministries, departments and agencies under the 
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sufficient for policy implementation. However, in the late 1970's no compre-
hensive program existed in Bangladesh for preparing the system of population 
projections needed for development planning. Various agencies and institu-
tions (including the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics and the research, 
evaluation, statistics and planning (RESP) unit of the PCFP Directorate) 
prepared or proposed to undertake projections of total population by sex and 
age. However, according to a Need Assessment Mission (UNFPA, 1978) more 
population projections were needed to meet the demands of socio-economic 
planning on the sectoral and regional levels. It seems that according to that 
UN Mission: " ... despite the emphasis on the progressive integration of 
population policies in development planning manifest in the national popu-
lation policy outline, no institutional arrangements exist at this time in 
Bangladesh for promoting a fuller consideration of population factors in 
development planning along the lines indicated above and for the coordination 
and undertaking of action-oriented research in this area." 
International agencies play a key role in almost all facets of socio-
economic activities in Bangladesh, including the supply and utilization of 
demographic knowledge. For example, in the First Five-Year Plan, real GDP was 
expected to grow by 4.0 percent per year based on an investment plan (public 
and private of 10.5 percent of GDP) of which 8.4 percent is based on foreign 
aid inflow. In the following Two-Year Plan there were 14.8 percent for ---~--~ ~--~---­
investment and 10.9 percent for foreign aid inflow. Domestic saving was not 
expected to exceed 4 percent (World Bank, 1979, p.27). It is not evident 
whether current efforts, deficient as they are, could be maintained in the 
absence of such external support. (For an inventory of recent international 
support for population activities in Bangladesh [1984/85] see UNFPA, 1986.) 
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The Hindu religious community is characterized by the existence of the 
caste system. In the past each of these caste groups had a well-defined 
social status and economic function in the society. The castes were closed 
social groups with a predominance of intra-caste marriage and social contacts. 
The so-called scheduled castes and tribes, constituting at present together 22 
percent of the total population, used to suffer severe social discrimination. 
After the independence, the Indian government made great efforts to reduce the 
social disparities and to make the economic opportunities more equal for 
members of all castes. Nevertheless the caste differentiation remains a 
living and influential fact of the social life of many parts of India. 
In consequence of this cultural and social differentiation, it is 
difficult not only to implement policies that might be efficient versus all 
the different cultural and social groups, among others simply in consequence 
of the difficulties of communication, but also it is difficult to formulate 
general statements about'the demographic, economic and social conditions and 
their tendencies of development of India, as these conditions and tendencies 
are very varied by region, denomination, cultural background and social 
groups. 
The level of per capita national income is higher in India than in 
Bangladesh and increased at a moderate, but considerate rate of 1.7 percent 
per year since 1955, The green revolution resulted in an important increase 
of yields at least in parts of India, so that the earlier recurrent famine 
crises could be avoided in recent years. Therefore the economic situation is 
less desperate than in Bangladesh. 
Nevertheless two grave concerns may be mentioned. First, the growth of 
per capita income was not evenly distributed in all social strata; it seems 
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that income inequalities increased, so that the more well-to-do parts of the 
society profited more from the economic development than the poorest strata. 
Second, it seems doubtful whether a similar rate of growth of the national 
income could be maintained in future decades, while it might be hypothesized 
that the rate of growth of the population will deciine only very slowly. 
DEMAND FOR DEMOGRAPHIC KNOYLEDGE: MAIN ISSUES 
The total population of India has virtually doubled since independence. 
The growth rate of the population did not decline in spite of the important 
efforts of population policies to reduce the growth rate. 
In terms of the population growth rate the regions and states of India 
are strongly differentiated. In the states of Kerala, Orissa and Tamil Nadu 
the growth rate declined to a significant degree; the states of Gujarat, 
Haryana, Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal experienced slight declines, while the 
growth rate increased in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Karnataka, 
Punjab, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. On the whole the growth rate of popula-
tion declined in 8 of the 14 major states of India, accounting for 46 percent 
of the total population of India in 1981. 
The apparent failure of India's rate of population growth to decline was 
caused essentially by the fact that the death rate declined parallel with the 
birth rate. The regional differences of the growth rate were caused by 
differences in the rates of decline of the death and birth rate. 
The most striking demographic change since the 1920's has been the 
dramatic fall of the death rate from about 45 per thousand in the 1920's to 
about 15 in the mid-1970's. Since the mid-1970's the decline of mortality has 
slowed down. The decline was caused most of all to the public health pro· 
grams, among others those reducing the incidence of malaria. 
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THE SUPPLY AND UTILIZATION OF DEMOGRAPHIC KNOWLEDGE 
In spite of the difficulties caused by the size of the population, the 
cultural diversity and the low level of economic development, India has a 
relatively very well developed system of demographic statistics. 
The censuses, conducted since 1,881 in 10-year intervals, provide the 
basic information, not only on the number of population but also on fertility 
levels, that can be estimated from age distribution data. The 1981 census 
contained data on current and retrospective fertility. 
The registration of vital events was introduced in the last decades of 
the 19th century. It did not cover, however, the total population and placed 
more emphasis on obtaining information on deaths and causes of death rather 
than on other vital events. 
After 1951, with the realization that population growth was very rapid, 
a need was felt to have complete and correct information on births and deaths. 
At present the compulsory registration of births, deaths and still-births 
·extends to the whole of India. The coverage, however, is still considered to 
be incomplete, especially in poor rural areas of some states. 
In order to have more exact information a sample registration system was 
initiated, first on a pilot basis in some states, and was expanded in 1971 to 
almost the entire country. It combines a continuous observation of vital 
events with a series of retrospective surveys. The continuous registration is 
done by an enumerator, preferably the local school teacher, and the six-
monthly surveys are done by a full-time supervisor .. This sample registration 
system has become the most important source of demographic knowledge. In some 
states, nevertheless, it is considered that sampling and non-sampling errors 
impair the quality of the data. 
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approach. Motivation by the mass media and by the health staff was incor· 
porated. 
A Department of Family Planning was created in the Ministry of Health 
and Family Planning in 1966, and the IUD was introduced into the program. 
However, this new approach again did not bring the expected results. After an 
initial period of encouraging response, the IUD became less acceptable because 
of its perceived side-effects. In the following period sterilization was 
emphasized as one of the main proposed methods of family planning and cash 
incentives were given to acceptors. In spite of all these efforts the 
population growth rate between 1961 and 1971 failed to decline, nay it was 
estimated to be somewhat higher than in the previous decade. 
This again led to a reassessment of the program. A new National 
Population Policy was announced in 1976, aiming at a "direct assault on the 
problem of population." The measures envisaged included: raising the minimum 
age of marriage to 18 for brides and 21 for grooms; increasing the levels of 
education of women; spreading small family size values; encouraging voluntary 
organizations to participate in family planning activities; and providing 
incentives for individuals, groups and communities to adopt family planning. 
During the period of national emergency, sterilization was given 
priority. 8.3 million sterilizations were performed in 1976·1977, allegedly 
in some or many cases also without the full consent of the acceptors. The 
sterilization program was considered outrageous by important parts of the 
population and was most probably one of the factors of the election victory of 
the opposition parties in 1977. The new Janata Government reversed the policy 
of sterilizations and formulated a new Population Policy in 1977, based on a 
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couples. The possibility of upward mobility and the prospect of paupe~iza­
tion, e.g., might be important factors motivating families to have fewer 
children. In the poorest strata, in the scheduled castes and tribes, however, 
these prospects are realistically evaluated as almost nil and a higher number 
of children might even contribute to defend parents from pauperization. 
It was noted also that demography is at present unable to provide a 
reliable explanation of the factors of fertility; explanations emphasizing the 
knowledge and availability of birth control methods, explanations based on 
economic factors and explanations emphasizing cultural factors, among others 
religion, are competing with each other and lead obviously to rather different 
recommendations for policy. Therefore, as Desai (1985) stated, "there is no 
evidence that our insights have acquired depth in an explanatory sense which 
may help the policy maker to improve his policy design." He concluded that 
"it is population studies that matter and not technical demography, however 
sophisticated it may be. Demography is in essence a kitty of tools, tech-
niques, methods, paradigms, models and constructs." You can draw scenarios 
and stimulate structures and compositions with the whole gamut of sophisti-
cated rates, ratios, matrices, gradients and what have you. They may help us 
to gain insight, to understand a situation, but the more sophisticated we 
become in the use of tools, the less knowledgeable about substantive issues we 
are likely to become. Therefore, one of the important conditions for success· 
ful use of demographic insights in policy making is to maintain the simplicity 
of expression of these insights." 
Desai added that "demographic knowledge must have wider connotation 
than mere quantitative analysis of population, population change and its 
components. What lies behind the changes in the components in the fields, say 
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Indonesia and from the Philippines, than in Sarawak (2.4 percent) and in 
Peninsular Malaysia (2.2 percent). The data and most of the statements in the 
following refer to Peninsular Malaysia. 
The specificity of Malaysia consists in its population's very clear 
division into three ethnic groups. Peninsular Malaysia's population was 55 
percent Malays, 34 percent Chinese, 10 percent Indians and 1 percent of other 
ethnic origin. The ethnic distinction is strengthened by religious differ-
ences: 99 percent of the Malays belong to Islam, 56 percent of the Chinese 
belong to Buddhism and 39 percent of them to Confucianism, and 84 percent of 
the Indians belong to Hinduism (Saw, 1988). 
The ethnic groups are also socio-economically differentiated: the Malay 
population is predominantly rural and agrarian; the chinese are engaged mainly 
in commerce, industries and services, and live mostly in urban areas; a large 
part of the Indians are employed as wage laborers on agricultural plantations. 
The ethnically mixed population developed mostly during the British 
colonial rule. The immigration of Chinese and of Indians was stimulated and 
organized by the British in order to have sufficient manpower in tin mining 
and on the plantations. Since 1956, the international migration balance of 
the Chinese and Indian populations is negative, i.e., they experience a loss 
in consequence of emigration, while the balance of the Malaysian population is 
slightly positive. 
While Bangladesh and India belong to the low income economic group, 
Malaysia belongs to the upper middle income group according to the World Bank 
classification. The growth rate of per capita national income since 1960 was 
considerable. Consequently the level of per capita income was estimated to be 
7 times higher than in India and more than 13 times higher than in Bangladesh. 
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DEMAND FOR DEMOGRAPHIC IQIOII'LEDGE: MAIN ISSUE 
In the decade 1947-1957 the yearly growth rate of the population of 
Peninsular Malaysia was 2.5 percent and only in the 1970's did it decline to 
2.2 percent. In consequence, with the usual patterns of demographic transi· 
tion the decline of the death rate preceded the decline of the birth rate, 
Already in the mid-1930's the death rate was as low as around 20 per thousand 
and with the exception of a high mortality in the war years of 1943-1945 it 
declined continuously, reaching very low levels in the 1970's partly in 
consequence of the young age structure. Fertility began to decline slowly in 
the late 1950's and then more rapidly in the 1960's until the first half of 
the 1970's. By 1975 the decline of fertility seems to have been stalled among 
the Malays and slowed down also among the Chinese and the Indians, 












It could be argued that these ethnical fertility differences are obviously 
caused by the different socio-economic composition of the ethnical groups, but 
the influence of other factors, like religion, cannot be excluded, 
An important factor in the decline of the total fertility rate was the 
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conducted on population matters. The National Population and Family Dsvelop-
ment Board has been actively engaged in conducting, promoting and coordinating 
population research. A Population Studies Unit has been established at the 
University of Malaysia. By 1980 more than 800 research papers and reports on 
population issues were published. 
In view of the changes of the governmental population policies, an 
intriguing question is how much of this demographic knowledge was used in 
policy making. 
Before 1960, in spite of the availability of a wealth of reasonably 
accurate population data, the government did not use demographic knowledge as 
its attitude toward population growth was essentially indifferent. Family 
planning activities were going on in some parts of the country since 1953 on a 
' voluntary basis without the financial support of the government. The govern-
ment was silent on population policy and family planning because of the 
allegedly controversial nature of these questions in a plural, i.e., multi-
ethnic, society. 
Economic problems around 1960 contributed to the change of official 
attitudes. Natural rubber production experienced a crisis in consequence of 
the growth of synthetic rubber industry. The per capita income actually 
declined in Malaysia between 1960 and 1962. The high fertility among the 
disadvantaged social groups contributed to growing income differences. 
Unemployment increased. 
These economic difficulties spurred the government to adopt a policy 
aiming at the decline of fertility. The Economic Planning Unit in the Prime 
Minister's Department expressed grave concerns over the adverse effects of 
rapid population growth in the economic development plan in 1963. It was 
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Malay political power. Several leaders had therefore urged the Government to 
review its family planning policy. Nevertheless, with the open support for 
the family planning programme by non-Malay political parties, and the 
assurance that the Malays would remain a majority, even with family planning, 
the ethnic-political issue was soon relegated." 
The Fourth Malaysia Plan (1980-1985), however, showed a shift in 
emphasis. Statements on the adverse economic effects of a rapid rate of 
population growth were absent from the plan. Instead the emphasis was on 
manpower planning and the need to upgrade the quality and productivity of the 
labor force. On the basis of the optimistic economic outlook for the future 
and the expected deceleration of population growth, a reduction of the 
unemployment rate, nay the possibility of the emergence of labor shortages, 
was envisaged. 
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad completely reversed the goals of 
population policy in an address to the United Malays National Organization 
general assembly: " ... Malaysia's population is relatively small and the 
nation has the capacity to generate wealth that will support a much larger 
population. The domestic market is relatively small and this has also put 
constraints on the development of industries. Recognizing that a large 
population constitutes an important human resource to create a larger consumer 
base with increasing purchasing power to generate and support industrial 
growth through productive exploitation of national resources, Malaysia could, 
therefore, plan for a larger population which could ultimately reach 70 
million." 
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really big country among the "tigers" of Asia having achieved a very rapid 
economic development from an underdeveloped to a developed economy. It 
achieved this in spite of some very disadvantageous conditions. It is not 
only very densely populated and rather poor in natural resources, but in 
addition, apart from Germany, which was defeated in the Second World War, 
Korea is the only country of the world which remained as a victim of the war 
divided into two parts between which there is indeed very little contact. It 
suffered also a devastating war in 1950-1951. 
DEMAND FOR DEMOGRAPHIC KNOWLEDGE: MAIN ISSUES 
After the Koresn war, the government implicitly followed a pro-natalist 
policy to preserve national power and military strength. During the 1950's 
family planning activities were undertaken by voluntary agencies. 
An explicit population policy was initiated by the government in 1962. 
In the beginning family planning programs were emphasized in order to prevent 
the anticipated explosion of population that might have been eventually caused 
by the baby boom of the postwar years, parallel the period of rapid economic 
growth began. The total fertility rate declined in the following two decades 
from 6.0 in 1960 to 2.6 in 1983. Mortality declined similarly but at a less 
rapid rate. In consequence the rate of population growth declined from 3.0 
percent in 1960 to 1.6 percent in 1983. It would be difficult to ascertain 
exactly how much of the decline of fertility was due to the rapid economic and 
social development and how much was due to the family planning program. 
It is projected that the population of the Republic of Korea will 
stabilize around 60 million by 2050. Although there are still several adverse 
factors related to population growth, like non-preference, no further increase 
in the age at marriage (23.7 years for women in 1980), entry of the baby boom 
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cohorts to the prime childbearing ages, slowing down of the decline of 
fertility, mortality and population growth rates, the main problem in the 
field of population is no longer the rate of growth but rather the very high 
rate of urban growth, first of all in the Seoul Metropolitan area. 
The total population of Seoul was 2.45 million in 1960 and 8.92 million 
in 1983. The second major urban concentration is Pusan. The total urban 
population increased 3.1 times in the period from 1960 to 1980, while the 
total population of the country increased 1.5 times, The urban areas absorbed 
about 15 million people, while the total population increase during that 
period was only 13 million, i.e., 2 million less. In 1980 the population of 
Seoul amounted to 23.3 and that of Pusan to 8.4 percent of the total popula-
tion of the Republic of Korea. 
Thus it might be stated that while the policy of controlling the growth 
of the population might be considered successful, the population distribution 
policy has not been successful. It might be conjectured that in at least some 
countries having attained an advanced phase of the demographic transition, the 
problem of population distribution, the very rapid rate of urbanization, the 
growth of one or of several megapolises replaces population growth as the main 
demographic problems. 
TilE SUPPLY AND UTILIZATION OF DEMOGRAPHIC KNOWLEDGE 
The Republic of Korea has well developed demographic statistics and 
several research institutions and university departments providing information 
of demographic issues, This demographic knowledge seems to have been well 
utilized in the policies aiming at a decline of fertility and of the growth 
rate of population. The utilization was less successful in the formulation 
and implementation of the population redistribution policy. 
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These conclusions by Kim (1985) point to the fact that the utilization 
of scientific knowledge in planning and policy implementation depend to a 
great extent on the general characteristics of the political system, i.e., on 
the authoritarian versus democratic features of the political decision 
mechanisms. 
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' 7able A-1. SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS - ASIA: Selected Countries 
GENERAL ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
GNP per Capita Gross Domestic Saving WB MB % of GNP 
Rank Rank % Growth 
1984$ (64-84) 1965 1985 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
East Asia 
China 20 UM/S 310 4.5 25 30 
Bong Kong 92 Hi/S 6,330 6.2 29 29 
Korea, R. 84 Hi/S 2,110 6.6 8 30 
Southeast Asia 
Burma 7 LM/N 180 2.3 13 17 
Indonesia 42 LM/M 540 4.9 6 20 
Malaysia 80 UM/M 1,980 4.5 23 32 
Philippines 46 UM/M 660 2.6 21 18 
Singapore 94 Hi/S 7,260 7.8 10 43 
Thailan'd 56 UM/M 860 4.2 19 21 
South Asia 
Bangladesh 2 L/W 130 0.6 8 4 
India 15 LM/M 260 1.6 16 22 
Nepal 6 L/W 160 0.2 (") 10 
Pakistan 28 LM/W 380 2.5 13 6 
Sri Lanka 26 UM/M 360 2.9 13 20 
West Asia 
Iraq 96 UM/W 7,300* .. 31 .. 
Jordan 70 Hi/N 1,570 4.8 .. -16 
Kuwait 100 Hi/N 16,720 -0.1 60 30 
Saudi Arabia 99 LM/N 10,530 5.9 48 32 
Syria 71 UM/N 1,620 4.5 10 12 
Yemen Arab R. 43 L/N 550 5.9 • • -22 
Sources: World Bank: World Development Reports 1984, 1986; World Population 
Projections 1985. 
United Nations: World Population Trends, Population and Development 
Interrelations and Population Policies: 1983 Monitoring 
Report, Vol. 1 and II. 
\ 
Table A-1 (cont.) 
DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS 
URBANIZATION POPULATION MOMENTUM DEPENDENCY 
% Urban Urban Growth Year 0-14 
Population Reach Size Ratio in 2000 
1965 1984 65-73 73-84 Momentum NRR=l Stationa!2 1980 ('80c1002 
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 
East Asia 
China 18 22 3.0 2.9 1.6 2000 1600 68 75 
Hong Kong 89 93 2.1 2.6 1.4 2010 7 46 120 
Korea, R. 32 64 6.5 4.6 1.6 2000 66 60 103 
Southeast Asia 
Burma 21 29 4.0 4.0 1.8 2020 87 82 137 
Indonesia 16 25 4.1 4.5 1.8 2010 361 82 124 
Malaysia 26 31 3.3 3.6 1.8 2005 33 74 105 
Philippines 32 39 4.0 3.7 1.8 2015 137 82 117 
Singapore 100 100 1.8 1.3 1.4 2010 3 45 102 
Thailand 13 18 4.8 3.1 1.8 2005 101 77 107 
South Asia 
Bangladesh 6 18 6.6 7.7 1.9 2030 310 83 159 
India 19 25 4.0 4.2 1.7 2010 1700 78 116 
Nepal 4 7 4.3 8.4 1.8 2040 74 85 147 
Pakistan 24 29 4.3 4.4 1.8 2035 353 89 146 
Sri Lanka 20 21 3.4 3.5 1.7 2005 32 70 117 
West Asia 
Iraq 51 70 5.7 5.5 1.9 2025 71 97 160 
Jordan 47 72 4.7 4.7 1.9 2020 17 111 172 
Kuwait 75 93 9.3 7.7 1.8 2010 5 79 168 
Saudi Arabia 39 72 8.4 7.3 1.8 2030 61 86 180 
Syria 40 49 4.8 4.3 1.9 2020 39 102 162 
Yemen Arab R. 5 19 4.1 4.5 1.9 2040 39 96 147 
•' 
~ 
Tabla A-1 (cant.) 
POLICY INDICATORS 
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